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Copyright 2005 by Richardson, Outlaw, Raulston, and Knapek.  All rights reserved.  
Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any 
means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies.   Cutting the federal budget deficit is an objective of the current Administration, as 
indicated in the President’s 2005 Budget (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2005).  
Thirteen times since 1980 the Congress has used budget reconciliation to cut spending on 
mandatory programs (US House of Representatives 2005).  Authorizing committees can 
reduce spending on discretionary programs at anytime, but cutting expenditures on 
mandatory programs requires special legislation.  Much of the spending for agriculture 
and the farm bill is classified as mandatory spending, therefore, a budget reconciliation is 
required if these programs are to be cut. 
 
  The President called for a $6.96 billion ($5.7 from commodity programs and $1.26 
from crop insurance) savings in expenditures to agriculture over a five year program 
(U.S. Congressional Budget Office 2005).  A budget reconciliation is required to achieve 
these budget savings from farm bill authorized expenditures.  If the Budget Committees 
directed the Agriculture Committees to save, say, $5 billion over five years, the 
Agriculture committees could achieve the savings a number of ways.  For example, the 
savings could be achieved by reducing expenditures for food and nutrition programs, 
conservation, or income supports.  How the Agriculture Committees decide to achieve a 
Budget Resolution depends on their perceived impacts of the cuts and the political 
ramifications. 
 
  It is unlikely that all of the budget savings will be in the form of lower income 
supports to agriculture.  However, it is even more unlikely that these support programs 
will be left uncut.  If the Agriculture Committees are required to reduce support 
payments, should they reduce counter-cyclical payments, direct payments, loan 
deficiency payments, or all three? 
 
  The objective of this paper is to analyze the impacts on the economic viability of 
U.S. crop producers of alternative methods of reducing federal expenditures on income 
supports.  The consequences of saving $1, $2, $3, $4, or $5 billion from spending on 
income supports for nine program crops over a five year period is analyzed in terms of 
the impacts on crop farmers economic viability (measured by net cash farm income) and 




  Income supports to major program crops are paid as counter-cyclical (CCP), direct 
(DP), and loan deficiency/marketing loan gain (LDP) payments.  Reducing DPs is 
hypothesized to have a greater negative impact on net cash income and certainty 
equivalence of net income (CENI) because the DP is a fixed (guaranteed amount) while 
the other two types of payments are subject to risk (vary with production and/or price).  
Because LDPs are paid on all production and CCP is paid on a fraction of historical 
production, a reduction in CCPs may reduce CEIN more than if the budget savings come 
in the form lower LDPs. 
 
  A three step methodology was used to quantify and compare the impacts of 
reductions in DP, CCP, and LDP on U.S. crop producers.  In the first step, a model of the annual farm program payments to nine major crops as developed in Richardson and 
Outlaw (2005) is used to determine the target prices, direct payment rates, payment 
fractions, and loan rates necessary to achieve budget savings targets.  The second step in 
the methodology calls for simulating representative crop farms with the resulting target 
prices, direct payments rates, payment fractions, and loan rates identified in the first step 
for each budget savings level.  The final step involves calculating and comparing CEs of 
the net cash income distributions for each representative crop farm across the policy 
parameters identified for the different budget savings targets.  The resulting CEINs are 
examined to determine which type of program change, reducing CCPs, DPs, LDPs, or a 
combination, would be least damaging to the economic viability of U.S. crop producers. 
 
Budget Savings Model 
 
  The March 2005 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) Baseline for CCC and FCIC 
provides a projection of annual CCP, DP, and LDP program payments for feed grains, 
wheat, rice, upland cotton, soybeans, and peanuts.  The CBO Baseline was used to 
develop a stochastic simulation model that calculates annual payments for these program 
crops over 2006-2015.  The model uses the same stochastic framework as CBO to 
calculate program payments over the complete range of possible crop prices and 
weighing these costs by the probability of price falling in the associated range.  The 
model is naive in that it does not allow a production response to changes in target prices, 
direct payment rates, payment fractions and loan rates.  Given that CCPs and DPs are 
decoupled from production, this assumption is not viewed as a limitation to the model.  
The lack of a production response to reductions in loan rates is not a significant limitation 
if the loan rate reductions are small in percentage terms. 
 
  Extensions in the current model beyond the model used to develop the CBO 
Baseline include an update of the probability distributions for prices based on the January 
2005 FAPRI Stochastic Baseline and the inclusion of minor feed grains, comprised of 
sorghum, barley, and oats.  These minor feed grains were added to the model using the 
January 2005 FAPRI Baseline projections of DPs, CCPs, and LDPs for these crops.  The 
CBO Baseline reports total payments to the three minor feed grains.  The proportion of 
payments in FAPRI’s Baseline paid annually to each crop was used to apportion CBO’s 
projected payments to the minor feed grains.  The mix of payments (CCP, DP, and LDP) 
to the minor feed grains was estimated using the fraction of payments for these programs 
in the FAPRI Baseline (Table 1). 
 
  An optimal control mechanism (Solver in Microsoft® Excel) was used to estimate 
price wedges, LDP wedges, and program participation fractions implicit in the CBO 
Baseline that were not reported.  After calibrating the model to the March 2005 CBO 
Baseline, the difference in total payments (error) for the nine program crops over the 
2006 to 2015 period between the two models was $1.907 billion, or 1.534 percent, on a 
$124.3 billion budget forecast.   
 
  Five levels of federal budget savings were tested for the current study.  The levels of 
cumulative savings over five years were:  $1, $2, $3, $4, and $5 billion.  The budget savings model was solved using optimal control techniques for each of these five budget 
savings assumptions to find the optimal reduction in target prices needed to reach each 
goal.  The model was then solved five times to find the optimal reductions in direct 
payments to reach the targeted budget savings.  The process was repeated to find the 
payment fractions that would meet the assumed budget savings.  Reductions in loan rates 
that would achieve the assumed budget savings were solved for in the same manner. 
 
  The results of the optimal control analysis to set target prices, direct payment rates, 
payment fractions, and loan rates to achieve certain budget savings are summarized in 
Table 2.  A budget savings of $1 billion over five years can be achieved by reducing the 
target prices for all crops by 0.5 percent (Table 2).  At the other extreme, a $5 billion 
budget savings could likely be achieved by a 2.6 percentage reduction in target price.  
Reducing the payment rate fraction from 0.85 to 0.80 (or 6.3 percent) would save an 
estimated $3 billion.  Reducing the payment rate fraction to 0.76 (or 10.5 percent) would 
save $5 billion. 
 
  Reducing the direct payment rate reduces the DP, but increases the CCP.  As a result 
the direct payment rates for all crops would have to be reduced 35 percent to achieve a $1 
billion net savings (Table 2).  The maximum savings which could be obtained through 
reductions in the direct payment rate is $1.2 billion and comes from reducing the direct 
payment rate 64.5 percent.  Richardson and Outlaw (2005) pointed out this characteristic 
of the 2002 farm bill, where decreases in one type of payment lead to larger increases in 
another type.  Using the November 2004 CBO baseline, which had considerably higher 
projected prices, they found that reducing the loan rate could increase net payments 
resulting from higher CCPs.  Using the March 2005 CBO baseline; however, the results 
of the model suggest net savings are possible from loan rate reductions.  However, 
reducing loan rates to achieve targeted budget savings does not behave well in an optimal 
control setting.  The results in Table 2 suggest that a 0.6 percent reduction in all loan 
rates would result in a $.82 billion net savings, while a 4.9 percent reduction would result 
in 4.98 billion net savings. 
 
Farm Level Analysis 
 
  The target prices, loan rates, direct payment rates, and payment fractions implied by 
the fractions in Table 2 were used to simulate net cash farm income probability 
distributions for 16 representative crop farms.  The January 2005 FAPRI Baseline was 
the base situation for the crop farms (FAPRI 2005).  Each farm was simulated over the 
2006-2010 planning horizon using the policy parameters associated with each level of 
budget savings ($1 to $5 billion). 
 
  The 16 crop farms used for the analysis are moderate size feed grain, wheat, cotton, 
and rice farms in the AFPC data base (Richardson, et al. 2005).  Data to define the 
representative farms were obtained from panel farm interviews with producers in major 
production regions (Table 3).  The farms are assumed to initially all have a 20 percent 
debt to asset ratio to control for the effects of initial debt situation on the outcomes across 
crop types and regions.  Ten years of historical crop yields for the farms and 10 years of historical prices were used to estimate multivariate empirical distributions for the farms 
using the technique described by Richardson, Klose and Gray (2000).  The farms were 
simulated assuming producers do not change their crop mix or planted acres in response 
to changes in the CCPs, DPs, or LDPs. 
 
  The Farm Level and Income Policy Simulation Model (FLIPSIM) was used as the 
simulation model for the representative farms.  FLIPSIM, developed by Richardson and 
Nixon (1986), has been used to conduct farm level policy analyses for more than 25 
years.  The model simulates the annual activities of a farm (production, marketing, 
finance, taxes, machinery replacement, farm program participation, and asset valuation) 
under alternative farm programs, for a wide variety of farm types and production regions.  
For the current study, the key output variables from FLIPSIM are:  net cash farm income, 
ending cash reserves, and the probability of declining real ending net worth.  Annual net 
cash farm income for the 2006 to 2010 period is discounted to calculate the present value 
of net cash income over the planning horizon.  Dividing the present value of net cash 
income by the number of years simulated, results in an average annual net income 
(PVNCI) in 2005 dollars.  The empirical probability distributions of PVNCI from the 
stochastic simulations are used to rank the alternative policy tools for risk adverse 
decision makers.   
 
  The stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) procedure reported by 
Hardaker, et. al. (2004) was used as the risk ranking procedure.  The SERF method ranks 
risky alternatives based on the assumption that decision makers prefer more CENI to less 
at each risk aversion level.  The risky alternatives, different policies for saving $1 to 5 
billion in government payments, are ranked for each of the 16 representative farms over a 
range of possible risk aversion coefficients (RACs).  An advantage of the SERF 
procedure is that risk rankings are not tied to a single lower and upper RAC, but efficient 




  The results of the farm level simulation experiments are summarized in Table 4 for 
four (Iowa feed grains, Texas cotton, Kansas wheat, and Arkansas rice) of the 16 
representative farms.  The results for the other 12 farms show the same pattern for net 
cash farm income, ending cash reserves, and probability of a lower real net worth, as 
observed for the four farms highlighted in Table 4. 
 
  In general, the farms are projected to have higher average net cash farm income 
(NCFI) with a loan rate cut regardless of the level of savings followed by the target price 
cut, payment fraction reduction, and direct payment cut.  The only exception being the 
5000 acre Texas cotton farm as NCFI averages the highest over the period with a direct 
payment cut followed by the loan rate cut, payment fraction reduction, and then target 
price cut.  The results for average ending cash follow the same pattern as NCFI.  There is 
very little difference in the probability losing real equity over the period across farms, 
regardless of budget savings amount or method used to attain the savings. 
   The SERF rankings in Table 5 summarize the overall impacts of the alternative 
budget savings policy options for all 16 farms.  There were only 7 of the 16 farms that 
had the same rankings across all five payment reduction levels.  The Iowa, Texas 
Northern Plains, South Carolina, and Indiana feed grains farms, the Colorado wheat farm, 
and California and Missouri rice farms all ranked the loan rate cut first, followed by the 
target price cut, payment fraction reduction, and direct payment cut.  Note, the direct 
payment cut was only included in the rankings for a $1 billion reduction.  The preferred 
method of reduction changed from a loan rate to a target price cut above a $2 billion 
reduction for a group of farms including the Washington, North Dakota, and Kansas 
wheat farms, and the Texas and Arkansas Rice farms.  Of interest is the fact that, while 
results are only available for a $1 billion reduction, a direct payment cut was most 
preferred for the California and Texas cotton, followed by a loan rate cut, target price cut, 
and payment fraction reduction.  The Alabama and Arkansas cotton farms ranked the 
loan rate cut 1
st, direct payment cut 2
nd, target price cut 3
rd, and payment fraction cut last, 
given a $1 billion reduction in spending.  At higher spending reduction levels, the 
preferences were for a loan rate cut, followed by a target price cut and payment fraction 
reduction. 
 
  While a target price cut has been discussed as the easiest (both politically and 
practically) to carryout, these results indicate that most producers would be less adversely 
impacted by cuts to loan rates that would achieve the same desired budget savings.  
While there are some differences among farms as to the 1
st or 2
nd most preferred method, 
it is clear that a reduction in the payment fraction would be the least preferred method 
when looking across all farms and budget savings levels. 
 
  These results provide a clear indication of why it is so difficult to develop and/or 
change farm programs.  The 16 representative farms provide geographic and commodity 
representation across the United States.  That less than one-half of the farms preferred 
one method of cutting over another is a clear indication that it is very hard to obtain a 




  The prospects for a budget reconciliation to help reduce the federal budget deficit 
appear quite good for 2005.  As the authorizing committees, the Agriculture Committees 
will likely be asked how they want to meet their share of the budget reconciliation.  Do 
they want to reduce CCPs, DPs, or LDPs or do they want to reduce other types of 
mandatory payments, such as conservation, crop insurance subsidies, or food and 
nutrition programs? Assuming the Agricultural Committees will choose to reduce CCPs, 
DPs or LDPs for at least a portion of the budget reconciliation, several levels of budget 
savings were analyzed. 
 
  The objective was to determine which payment reduction (CCP, DP, or LDP) would 
cause the least adverse impact on the economic viability of crop farmers.  A stochastic 
Budget Savings Model that mimics the budget scoring model used by CBO was used to 
estimate the reductions in target prices, loan rates, direct payment rates, and payment fractions necessary to achieve designated budget savings ($1, $2, $3, $4, and $5 billion) 
over 2006-2010.  The resulting policy scenarios were tested on 16 representative crop 
farms from the major production regions to quantify their impacts on economic viability. 
 
  Results of the Budget Savings Model indicated that the Agriculture Committees 
could likely save $3 billion by reducing target prices 1.5 percent, loan rates 3.2 percent, 
or by reducing the payment fraction from 0.85 to 0.80.  Net budget savings of $3 billion 
cannot be achieved by reducing the direct payment rate because CCPs increases more 
than offset DP savings.   
 
  The farm level results indicate that the least harmful way for the Agricultural 
Committees to achieve budget savings of $3 billion is to reduce loan rates.  At higher 
levels of net budget savings, some risk adverse decision makers would prefer that the 
Committees reduce target prices. 
 
  The results presented in this paper are not based on the same model that CBO will 
use to score alternative program changes to achieve budget reconciliation.  The results 
here are presented as a forum for discussion.  Also the authors recognize the CBO scoring 
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 Table 2.  Reductions in Target Prices, Payment Fractions, Direct Payment Rates, and Loan
Rates to Achieve Targeted Budget Savings over Five Years, 2006-2010.
Budget Savings for Five Years
$1 B. $2 B. $3 B. $4 B. $5 B.
Target Prices
Percentage Reduction (%) 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.6
Savings ($B.) 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00
Payment Fractions
Percentage Reduction (%) 2.1 4.2 6.3 8.4 10.5
Savings ($B.) 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00
Direct Payment Rate
Percentage Reduction (%) 34.7 64.5 100.0
Savings ($B.) 1.00 1.20 1.02
Loan Rate
Percentage Reduction (%) 0.6 1.3 3.2 4.2 4.9
Savings ($B.) 0.82 1.82 2.88 4.20 4.98 
Table 3.  Characteristics of Selected Representative Farms.
IAG2750 TXNP1750 SCG1500 ING1000 WAW1725 NDW2180 KSCW1385 COW3000 CAC2400 TXEC5000 ARC6000 ALC3000 CAR550 TXR1553 ARHR3000 MOER4500
County Webster Moore Clarendon Shelby Whitman Barnes Sumner Washington Kings Crosby Desha Lawrence Sutter Colorado Lawrence New Madrid
Total Cropland 2750 1750 1500 1000 1725 2180 1385 3000 2000 5000 6000 3000 550 1553 3000 4500
Acres Owned 380 160 500 250 518 276 485 1137 1000 640 1200 0 275 129 1000 1575
Acres Leased 2370 1590 1000 750 1207 1904 900 1863 1000 4360 4800 3000 275 1424 2000 2925
Assets
Total  ($1000) 2122 571 886 1739 1316 516 767 1132 5134 1137 6452 1805 1421 522 4130 6408
2004 Gross Receipts
Total ($1,000)* 737.7 580.2 511.8 291.3 441.6 341.2 185 262.3 2188.7 1265.8 3886.5 1179.5 448.7 401.5 1294.7 1612.1
2004 Planted Acres**
Total 2750 1750 1954 1000 1725 2080 1385 2475 2400 5000 6000 3000 500 855 3000 4500
Corn 1375 640 846 500 0 240 0 600000 7 5 0000 1500
Soybeans 1375 0 654 500 0 800 138000 1500 150 0 0 1250 1500
Wheat 0 870 454 0 1035 700 928 970 0 400000000
S o r g h u m 0 2 4 00000 3 1 900 3 0 0 5 0 000000
C o t t o n 00000000 1000 4300 2000 21000000
R i c e 0000000000 2000 0 500 855 1750 1500
O t h e r 0000 6 9 0 3 4 00 9 0 5 1 4 0 00000000
Source: Agricultural and Food Policy Center, Texas A&M University.
  *Receipts for 2004 are included to indicate the relative importance of each enterprise to the farm. Percents 
    indicate the percentage of the total receipts accounted for by the livestock categories and the crops.
 **Acreages for 2004 are included to indicate the relative importance of each enterprise to the farm. Total 
    planted acreage may exceed total cropland available due to double cropping. Percents indicate the percentage 




Table 4.  Results of Simulating Four Representative Crop Farms for Alternative Target Prices, 
Payment Fractions, Direct Payment Rates, and Loan Rates to Achieve Targeted Budget Savings.
Budget Savings for Five Years
$1 B. $2 B. $3 B. $4 B. $5 B.
IAG2750
Reduce Target Prices
Mean NCFI ($1,000) 253.078 251.46 249.783 248.196 246.55
Mean Ending Cash ($1,000) 288.02 284.13 280.11 276.36 272.54
P(Lower RENW) 1 1 1 1 1
Reduce Payment Fractions
Mean NCFI ($1,000) 253.031 251.34 249.65 247.961 246.272
Mean Ending Cash ($1,000) 287.87 283.77 279.72 275.63 271.61
P(Lower RENW) 1 1 1 1 1
Reduce Direct Payment Rate
Mean NCFI ($1,000) 250.036 247.471 245.621
Mean Ending Cash ($1,000) 280.58 274.28 269.55
P(Lower RENW) 1 1 1
Reduce Loan Rate
Mean NCFI ($1,000) 254.071 253.395 251.519 250.521 249.781
Mean Ending Cash ($1,000) 290.35 288.7 284.1 281.71 279.93
P(Lower RENW) 1 1 1 1 1
TXEC5000
Reduce Target Prices
Mean NCFI ($1,000) -5.537 -11.372 -17.353 -23.484 -29.622
Mean Ending Cash ($1,000) -980.47 -1007.21 -1034.8 -1063.26 -1091.91
P(Lower RENW) 96 96 96 96 96
Reduce Payment Fractions
Mean NCFI ($1,000) -5.414 -11.177 -16.943 -22.712 -28.484
Mean Ending Cash ($1,000) -980.16 -1006.82 -1033.65 -1060.61 -1087.71
P(Lower RENW) 96 96 96 96 96
Reduce Direct Payment Rate
Mean NCFI ($1,000) 6.695 12.59 20.034
Mean Ending Cash ($1,000) -924.56 -897.66 -863.91
P(Lower RENW) 94 94 92
Reduce Loan Rate
Mean NCFI ($1,000) -0.416 -1.268 -3.562 -4.781 -5.559
Mean Ending Cash ($1,000) -956.54 -959.99 -969.33 -974.4 -977.58
P(Lower RENW) 95 95 95 95 95 
Table 4.  Continued
Budget Savings for Five Years
$1 B. $2 B. $3 B. $4 B. $5 B.
KSCW1385
Reduce Target Prices
Mean NCFI ($1,000) 63.624 63.202 62.785 62.381 61.97
Mean Ending Cash ($1,000) -37.82 -39.02 -40.21 -41.4 -42.61
P(Lower RENW) 2 2 2 2 2
Reduce Payment Fractions
Mean NCFI ($1,000) 63.419 62.805 62.189 61.572 60.956
Mean Ending Cash ($1,000) -38.41 -40.17 -41.96 -43.79 -45.56
P(Lower RENW) 2 2 2 2 2
Reduce Direct Payment Rate
Mean NCFI ($1,000) 61.617 59.983 58.415
Mean Ending Cash ($1,000) -43.53 -48.51 -53.66
P(Lower RENW) 2 2 3
Reduce Loan Rate
Mean NCFI ($1,000) 63.743 63.416 62.495 61.995 61.633
Mean Ending Cash ($1,000) -37.49 -38.44 -41.08 -42.52 -43.53
P(Lower RENW) 2 2 2 2 2
ARHR3000
Reduce Target Prices
Mean NCFI ($1,000) 100.542 97.566 94.604 91.565 88.562
Mean Ending Cash ($1,000) -845.69 -859.25 -872.82 -886.81 -900.7
P(Lower RENW) 1 1 1 1 1
Reduce Payment Fractions
Mean NCFI ($1,000) 98.367 93.231 88.089 82.941 77.785
Mean Ending Cash ($1,000) -855.18 -878.21 -901.25 -924.45 -947.82
P(Lower RENW) 1 1 1 1 1
Reduce Direct Payment Rate
Mean NCFI ($1,000) 87.28 81.751 86.954
Mean Ending Cash ($1,000) -898.77 -922.01 -899.27
P(Lower RENW) 1 1 1
Reduce Loan Rate
Mean NCFI ($1,000) 101.367 99.05 92.626 89.19 86.843
Mean Ending Cash ($1,000) -841.77 -852.15 -881.14 -896.71 -907.4
P(Lower RENW) 1 1 1 1 1 Table 5.  Rankings by Risk Averse Decision Makers for Alternative Farm Programs to Produce a
Targeted Budget Savings for 16 Representative U.S. Crop Farms 2006-2010. 
Budget Savings for Five Years
$1 B. $2 B. $3 B. $4 B. $5 B.
IAG2750
1st LR
1 LR LR LR LR
2 n d T PT PT PT PT P
3 r d P FP FP FP FP F
4th DP
TXNP1750
1 s t L RL RL RL RL R
2 n d T PT PT PT PT P
3 r d P FP FP FP FP F
4th DP
SCG1500
1 s t L RL RL RL RL R
2 n d T PT PT PT PT P
3 r d P FP FP FP FP F
4th DP
ING1000
1 s t L RL RL RL RL R
2 n d T PT PT PT PT P
3 r d P FP FP FP FP F
4th DP
WAW1725
1st LR LR TP TP TP
2nd TP TP PF PF PF
3rd PF PF LR LR LR
4th DP
NDW2180
1st LR LR TP TP TP
2nd TP TP LR LR LR
3 r d P FP FP FP FP F
4th DP
KSCW1385
1st LR LR TP TP TP
2nd TP TP LR LR LR
3 r d P FP FP FP FP F
4th DP
COW3000
1 s t L RL RL RL RL R
2 n d T PT PT PT PT P
3 r d P FP FP FP FP F
4th DP
CAC2400
1 s t D PL RL RL RL R
2 n d L RT PT PT PT P
3 r d T PP FP FP FP F
4th PF
TXEC5000
1 s t D PL RL RL RL R
2 n d L RP FP FP FP F
3 r d P FT PT PT PT P
4th TP
ARC6000
1 s t L RL RL RL RL R
2 n d D PT PT PT PT P
3 r d T PP FP FP FP F
4th PF
ALC3000
1 s t L RL RL RL RL R
2 n d D PT PT PT PT P
3 r d T PP FP FP FP F
4th PF
CAR550
1 s t L RL RL RL RL R
2 n d T PT PT PT PT P
3 r d P FP FP FP FP F
4th DP
TXR1553
1st LR LR TP TP TP
2nd TP TP LR LR LR
3 r d P FP FP FP FP F
4th DP
ARHR3000
1st LR LR TP TP TP
2nd TP TP LR LR LR
3 r d P FP FP FP FP F
4th DP
MOER4500
1 s t L RL RL RL RL R
2 n d T PT PT PT PT P
3 r d P FP FP FP FP F
4th DP
1 TP refers to reduction in target price, PF is a reduction in payment fraction, DP is a reduction in 
direct payments, and LR is a reduction in loan rates.  